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I. INTRODUCTION
“The International Law of Property,” by Professor Sprankling, traces the
1
historical nature and future direction of property rights in international law. He
should be congratulated for this ambitious undertaking and commended for his
many insights. In his excellent discussion of property in space, Professor
Sprankling has examined issues that are at the forefront of modern international
law, as the corpus juris spatialis is dynamic and evolving as the commercial
2
space age develops. The following discussion will focus on one aspect of
property in space: private enterprise and the resources of the Moon and other
celestial bodies.
Space is a unique medium with attributes unlike any physical area on Earth.
As such, it requires an approach that is also unique, one that is not burdened with
the historical shackles of terran-based legal regimes. The regulation of

* Attorney, Law Offices of Sterns and Tennen, Phoenix, Arizona; Legal Counsel, International Academy
of Astronautics; Former Commissioner, Arizona Space Commission Symposium, The Promise and Perils of an
International Law of Property Law, Mar. 6, 2015, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY (2014).
2. Id.
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commercial space activities will be developed with its own frame of reference
and specialized terminology, in physical and legal concepts. To be effective, the
legal regime must be able to protect the interests of all parties concerned with the
exploration and use of outer space. This includes states as well as nongovernmental entities, such as the public, the private sector, the scientific
community, and academia. Laws that provide predictability, transparency, and
enforceability are key to the peaceful development of the commercial space age.
The space treaties currently in force establish many of the fundamental
parameters of commercial space regulation, and domestic law regimes provide,
and will provide, additional components.
II. OUTER SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The primary international legal instrument, which governs the activities of
mankind in space, is the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
3
Celestial Bodies. The Outer Space Treaty was developed through the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and entered into force in
1967. More than 125 nations have signed or ratified the treaty, and four
additional treaties specifically relating to outer space have supplemented its
provisions.
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space provides for aid and assistance
to distressed astronauts, and for the return of personnel and objects that come into
4
the jurisdiction of states. The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects establishes rules and procedures for compensation for
damages caused by space objects on the surface of the Earth, to aircraft in flight,
5
and to objects in outer space. The Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space requires states to maintain a national register of
objects launched into outer space and to provide the Secretary-General of the
United Nations with specific information on such objects for inclusion in an
6
international register. The fifth space treaty in force is the Agreement Governing
the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, which contains

3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into
force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
4. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1968).
5. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T.
2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1972) [hereinafter Liability Convention].
6. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023
U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976) [hereinafter Registration Convention].
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7

specific provisions regarding the use of extraterrestrial resources. Although it
was opened for signature in 1979 and entered into force in 1984, the Moon
Agreement has been ratified by only sixteen states and signed by an additional
four, which does not include the United States, Russia or China. Nevertheless,
the Moon Agreement is part of the corpus juris spatialis, and it may be
8
applicable in particular situations.
The space treaties establish a comprehensive set of rules to guide mankind in
the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Primary among these rules are
9
that activities in space are to be conducted in conformity with international law.
Furthermore, outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is the
10
province of mankind and shall be used for peaceful purposes only. Astronauts
are considered to be “envoys of mankind.” Military installations, stations, and
maneuvers are prohibited on celestial bodies, as is the “testing of any type of
11
weapons.” Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall be
free for exploration and use by all states without discrimination, and there shall
be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. Moreover, states are internationally
12
liable for their national activities in space. The corpus juris spatialis contains
numerous provisions that have direct application to commercial ventures in space
resources.
III. THE NON-APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is at the epicenter of any discussion
concerning the use and exploitation of the resources of outer space. It provides:

7. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979,
1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 I.L.M. 1434 (entered into force July 11, 1984) [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
8. The Moon Agreement is a treaty between more than a dozen nations that entered into force pursuant to
its internal provisions, and it continues to attract new signatories. Parties and signatories to the treaty include
states that represent more than one-sixth of the Earth’s population, and include both states with independent
space capability, as well as member states of the European Space Agency (ESA). Although the ESA is not an
organizational party to the treaty, member states of ESA that are party to the Moon Agreement must be certain
that their participation in any mission, directly or indirectly, is consistent with their international agreements
and obligations. In addition, and significantly, India has signed the Moon Agreement and launched, and is
currently conducting an independent mission to Mars. Thus, activities directly subject to the Moon Agreement
are being conducted by a state that is a signatory to the international agreement. The pendency of ratification of
the treaty by India does not detract from the binding nature of the Moon Agreement, as states are obliged to
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty upon signature. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
9. See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. I–III (noting that space exploration and use should
be conducted “in accordance with international law”).
10. See, e.g., id. at art. IV (“The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes”).
11. Id. at arts. IV–V.
12. Id. at arts. I, VI.
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“Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or
13
by any other means.”
This non-appropriation doctrine was among earliest declarations of the
community of nations at the beginning of the space age—the General Assembly
14
unanimously adopted it in 1961. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty was
reaffirmed and restated in Article 11.2 of the Moon Agreement. The prohibition
on national appropriation in space has received widespread acceptance and has
represented state practice for more than fifty years. As such, it has become
customary international law that is binding on all states, whether or not they are a
15
party to the Outer Space Treaty or the Moon Agreement.
The operative phrase of Article II prohibits national appropriation of “outer
16
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.” What, then, is a celestial
body? The term is not defined in any of the space treaties. The scientific
community, acting through the International Astronomical Union, adopted
17
definitions of celestial bodies in 2006. Within the solar system and its environs,
the IAU recognizes the following celestial bodies: the Sun; the planets; the Moon
of Earth and the moons of other planets; Near-Earth Objects; dwarf planets;
18
trans-Neptunian objects; asteroids; comets; and Kuiper belt objects. Within the
context of the corpus juris spatialis, all of these objects would be considered
celestial bodies subject to the non-appropriation doctrine. Of course, it is possible
that by future international treaty or other agreement, certain objects or categories
of objects will be the subject of a specific instrument with special rules and
19
regulations. However, unless and until such specific instrument enters into
force, all of the natural bodies within the solar system that may be reached by an
object launched from Earth should be considered as a celestial body subject to
the Outer Space Treaty.
The non-appropriation doctrine prohibits claims of national appropriation of
celestial bodies, but does not prohibit the commercial use of extraterrestrial
resources. The manner in which the resources of the Moon and other celestial
bodies can be used and exploited has generated a considerable amount of
controversy. Those who advocate for the assertion and recognition of some form

13. Id. at art. II.
14. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), ¶ A(1)(b),
U.N. Doc. A/RES 1721(XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961).
15. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, at art. 38.
16. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II.
17. Int’l Astronomical Union [IAU], Definition of a Planet in the Solar System, IAU Doc. RES/B5
(2006).
18. Id.
19. The provisions of the Moon Agreement also apply to other celestial bodies unless specific agreements
are entered into regarding such other bodies. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 1.1.
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of terran real property estates on the Moon or other celestial bodies have been
20
especially critical of the non-appropriation doctrine.
The focus on “property rights” in space, in the sense of traditional real
property law, is misplaced. First, it does not substantively address the legitimate
interests of entrepreneurs that require legal protection in order to conduct
business. Second, claims of ownership of areas of celestial bodies or resources in
place are irrelevant to commercial products or services derived from those areas
and resources. Third, such claims are unnecessary to protect commercial ventures
on celestial bodies. Fourth, imparting traditional forms of property rights to
space, especially fee simple types of claims, violates the non-appropriation
principle. Such forms of property rights would only be relevant where there is an
intention to profit from the alienation and conveyance of the fee simple claim
21
and/or subsidiary interests derived therefrom.
IV. ENTERPRISE RIGHTS IN SPACE
The criticism of the non-appropriation doctrine fails to recognize that this
central principle of space law is essential to the creation of an environment in
which the commercialization of extraterrestrial resources can be conducted ab
22
initio. The corpus juris spatialis protects the exercise of commercial rights in
23
space consistent with the prohibition against national appropriation. The rights
of entrepreneurs to conduct business in space relate to the legal ability to use and
exploit extraterrestrial areas and materials for commercial gain. These are
24
“enterprise rights,” not ownership rights. Professor Sprankling correctly
25
described the protected interest to be in the nature of a usufruct. There are
numerous instances where commercial ventures utilize natural resources without
a concomitant claim of ownership of the physical area or location. Examples
include offshore oil platforms, grazing rights, logging rights, and, as Professor
26
Sprankling discussed, satellite orbits.
The formulation of specific parameters for enterprise rights in extraterrestrial
resources will be based, in part, on the particular circumstances of the resources.
That is, no one set of regulations will be appropriate for all resources in all
20. Wayne N. White Jr., Real Property Rights in Outer Space, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 40TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 370 (1998).
21. Kenneth M. Weidaw III, A General Convention on Space Law: Legal Issues Encountered in
Establishing Lunar and Martian Bases, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 47TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE 272, 275–77 (2005).
22. Leslie I. Tennen, Towards A New Regime for Exploitation of Outer Space Mineral Resources, 88
NEB. L. REV. 794 (2010).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. SPRANKLING, supra note 1, at 181–83, 189.
26. Id. at 191–92.
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circumstances. The intended use, relative abundance or scarcity, location of the
resources in situ, and whether the celestial body itself is movable are all factors
that may influence the course of regulation. A broad array of uses will emerge,
but in accordance with Article II, there is no right to exclusive occupation of an
27
area of space or celestial bodies in perpetuity. Thus, the non-appropriation
doctrine directly promotes space commerce, as it prevents any entity from
claiming a monopoly on an area or resource.
Far from being an impediment to space commerce, the non-appropriation
doctrine makes the commercialization of space possible. Throughout history, the
discovery of a new territory was immediately followed by a claim of national
sovereignty over the area. This claim could take the form of a physical presence,
planting a flag, or other rituals. While the manner of asserting claims by states
may have differed, the one attribute they shared was that claims of sovereignty
ultimately were recognized and enforced on the basis of military power. The
launch of Sputnik I presented the global community with new and profound
national security implications. As the first nation to launch a satellite into Earth’s
orbit, the Soviet Union was in a position to follow historical precedent and assert
claims of sovereignty resulting from the flight of Sputnik.
The U.S.S.R. was also the first nation to reach near-Earth orbits, cislunar
space, and the surface of the Moon, and could have claimed vast areas of the
cosmos as sovereign Soviet territory. Inevitably, these claims would have been
met with resistance, and other states would have made conflicting and competing
sovereignty claims. The threat to international peace and security would be
significant, and ultimately, disputes over claims could result in military
confrontation. The world chose a different approach: a mere four years after
Sputnik, the UN General Assembly recognized the res communis nature of space
and declared that outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
28
appropriation.
The non-appropriation doctrine was elevated to treaty status with the entry
into force of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967. In these early years of the space
age, the international community also declared that outer space was to be
explored and used for peaceful purposes only, in conformity with international
29
law, and prohibited military facilities, installations, and maneuvers in space.
The primary attribute of these provisions, taken together, is the maintenance of
30
outer space for peaceful purposes. Thus, the corpus juris spatialis established an
27. CLARENCE WILFRED JENKS, SPACE LAW 201 (1965); VIRGILIU POP, WHO OWNS THE MOON?
EXTRATERRESTRIAL ASPECTS OF LAND AND MINERAL RESOURCES OWNERSHIP 49–58 (2008); Ernst Fasan,
Asteroids and Other Celestial Bodies—Some Legal Differences, 26 J. SPACE L. 33, 33 (1998).
28. International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), ¶ A(1)(b),
U.N. Doc. A/RES 1721(XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961).
29. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. I, III, IV.
30. Id. at art. IV.

286

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
environment where both the public and private sectors can conduct activities
31
without the necessity for military defenses or fortifications. This is a tangible
32
benefit of space law. The alternative would have been an atmosphere of
insecurity where the cost of conducting missions would increase in direct
proportion to the defensive planning, armaments, and weaponry deemed
necessary for the protection of personnel and spacecraft.
There are some who seem to take this benefit of space law for granted and
urge that claims of various descriptions are permissible notwithstanding the nonappropriation doctrine. Often, these advocates base arguments on the absence of
the word “private” from Article II of the Outer Space Treaty. Thus, they assert,
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits national, i.e. governmental appropriation, but
33
not appropriation by non-governmental entities, i.e. the private sector. This
argument must fail for several reasons.
34
Article II prohibits “national” appropriation. The term “national” is defined
in Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty to include activities that are conducted by
35
governmental as well as non-governmental entities. Thus, a claim of
appropriation, even if made by a non-governmental entity, is nonetheless a
national activity, and is thereby prohibited by Article II. While Article VI
recognizes that non-governmental entities have a role in conducting activities in
space, states are internationally responsible for the activities of their nationals in
space. Moreover, pursuant to article VI, non-governmental entities are subject to
the authorization and continuing supervision of the appropriate state. States are
unable to authorize their non-governmental entities to conduct activities that
36
international law prohibits the state, itself, from conducting.
The process of state authorization and continuing state supervision provides
an opportunity for the development and supplementation of regulation of
commercial activities in space. The Outer Space Treaty does not designate any
specific form of legal regime to be adopted by states for the purpose of providing
authorization and continuing supervision of their private entities. States can adopt
any form of domestic regulatory oversight they deem appropriate and consistent
with their national interests and policies, subject to international treaty
obligations. At least fifteen nations have enacted legislation for the authorization
31. Patricia M. Sterns & Leslie I. Tennen, Institutional Approaches to Managing Space Resources, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 41ST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 33 (1999).
32. Id. at 35, n. 11 (citing statement by Eilene Galloway).
33. White Jr., supra note 20.
34. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II.
35. Id. at art. VI.
36. JENKS, supra note 27, at 201; H.L. van Traa-Engelman, Clearness Regarding Property Rights on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
38, 42 (1997); P. Sterns et al., Preliminary Jurisprudential Observations Concerning Property Rights on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies in the Commercial Space Age, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 39TH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 50, 56 (1997); Tennen, supra note 22, at 806.
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37

of private activities in space. Common provisions of national authorization
regimes include the examination of a license application for potential liability
concerns, any inconsistencies with national security interests, and compliance
38
with the international obligations and policies of the state. States usually require
39
a licensee to obtain insurance, although the state is internationally liable for
damages which exceed the amount of insurance coverage.
States are under a continuing duty to supervise the activities of their nationals
in space. Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that the state whose
registry carries an object launched into outer space retains jurisdiction and
control over said object and any personnel thereof while in space or on a celestial
40
body. Accordingly, objects launched into space, astronauts, and other personnel
of a spacecraft remain subject to the jurisdiction and laws of the registry state
notwithstanding their presence in space or on a celestial body. The applicability
of domestic laws has been extended to space, including laws relating to
intellectual property and the chain of command for personnel of a spacecraft.
It has been suggested that states could unilaterally establish a domestic
registry to document their nationals’ claims to space resources. Purportedly, this
would be consistent with the non-appropriation principle if the state issued a
proclamation that this registration scheme is “not to be appropriation.” In making
this proclamation, “the nation could make it clear that it was not claiming
sovereignty over such resources, but simply recognizing the claims of its
41
citizens.” This is a distinction without a difference. State recognition of claims
to extraterrestrial property by its nationals is national appropriation “by any other
means” prohibited by Article II, no matter what euphemistic label is employed to
42
mask the obvious. Moreover, the recognition of claims is only one side of the
equation—the other side is the exclusion or rejection of any competing or
conflicting claims. The de facto exclusion, by its very nature, would constitute a
form of national appropriation.
Since Article II does not permit private appropriation of space and celestial
bodies, it can be contended that the non-appropriation doctrine should be
abrogated. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether such action would, in fact,
benefit the space commercialization cause. Abrogation of the non-appropriation

37. For an examination of these national regulatory regimes, see generally NATIONAL REGULATION OF
SPACE ACTIVITIES (R. Jakhu, ed. 2010).
38. See, e.g., Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C. § 70105(a) (West 2006); see also Paul Stephen
Dempsey, United States Space Law: Commercial Space Launches and Facilities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 49TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 69, 73 (2007).
39. JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 20–21 (R. Jakhu ed., 2004).
40. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VIII.
41. Id.; Pat Dasch et al., Conference on Space Property Rights: Next Steps, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 42ND
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 174, 178 (2000).
42. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II.
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principle would result in assertions of competing and overlapping claims to
various orbits, the Moon, and other areas of space and celestial bodies, including
retroactive claims. As noted above, the Russians would have historic justification
for claiming vast reaches of near-Earth space. Other technologically advanced
nations—including the United States, China, France, Great Britain, India, and
others—could assert claims to any area or location where the claimant had any
basis for asserting that it was first to “discover” the subject of the claim, whether
by means of exploration, use, landing, imaging, mapping, surveying,
telepresence, or otherwise.
Enforcement of conflicting and overlapping claims would ultimately depend
on military means, creating a significant risk of hostilities on Earth and exporting
armed conflict into space. Even if military engagement could be avoided, states
claiming an area could impose substantial fees and charges in the form of taxes,
royalties, duties, auction fees, or other costs, even where claims overlap. Thus,
more than one state could levy such forms of imposed tribute. Furthermore, the
introduction of “private appropriation” to the mix would convolute the situation
even more. The ability of all states to explore and utilize celestial bodies would
no longer be a right per Article I of the Outer Space Treaty, but rather, it would
be a commodity available only to the highest bidder—an inherently
anticompetitive environment. Therefore, it is not a foregone conclusion that
abrogation of the non-appropriation principle would be beneficial for
entrepreneurs in space; the cost of doing business would increase significantly
for acquiring and protecting rights to occupy and use space resources, and for
physically protecting facilities from interference or attack.
The Outer Space Treaty recognizes the right of states to establish facilities,
43
stations, and other installations in the exploration of space and celestial bodies.
The Moon Agreement recognizes the right of states to collect and remove
44
samples, and to utilize minerals and other substances in support of missions.
The establishment of a facility on a celestial body, by itself, does not constitute a
claim of appropriation, as neither the Outer Space Treaty, nor the Moon
Agreement simultaneously authorize and prohibit the same activity.
The utilization of extracted resources presents a more complex issue. The
Outer Space Treaty recognizes the right to establish facilities in the exploration
of outer space, including celestial bodies, but does not expressly extend that same
right to the use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.
Similarly, the Moon Agreement limits collecting samples and using resources to
45
the support of scientific investigations. For the foreseeable future, virtually all
missions will have some aspect of scientific investigation, although they will not

43. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art IV.
44. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 6.2.
45. Id.
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necessarily be limited to exploration. The question is whether a mission must
have a designated percentage of scientific functions to qualify for the use of
extraterrestrial resources.
The Moon Agreement contains numerous provisions that are broadly termed
and includes missions conducted for reasons other than pure scientific
46
investigation. Both the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Agreement repeat
terms that may not have significant substantive differences in different contexts,
such as “equipment or any facility necessary,” as compared to “equipment,”
“facilities,” “stations” and “installations.” Certain treaty provisions may contain
an express reference only to “explorations” or “use,” but the context makes it
clear that the operative substance is to apply to all missions. Thus, the language
and context of the treaties authorize the use of extraterrestrial resources for other
purposes in addition to purely scientific investigations.
V. THE MOON AGREEMENT AND THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND
The most detailed and extensive provisions in any treaty relating to the use of
extraterrestrial resources are set forth in Article 11 of the Moon Agreement. This
article restates the non-appropriation doctrine, and expressly provides that no part
of the Moon, its surface, or subsurface, nor resources in place, shall become
property of any governmental or non-governmental entity, including natural
47
persons. This elaboration of the non-appropriation doctrine is not a substantive
departure from, but rather a clarification of, Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.
However, the Moon Agreement significantly departs from the Outer Space
Treaty in the remainder of Article 11, which declares the Moon and its resources
to be “the common heritage of mankind,” and obligates states to “undertake to
establish an international regime . . . to govern the exploitation of the resources
48
of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible.”
The Moon Agreement does not obligate states to establish the international
regime—it only requires that states, in good faith, undertake to establish the
49
international regime. It is possible that such an undertaking may fail to result in
the establishment of an international regime. Significantly, the Moon Agreement
also does not expressly impose a moratorium on the use of lunar resources
pending the establishment of an international regime.
It is clear that some form of legal regime will need to be developed to
regulate the exploitation of lunar and celestial resources, whether or not it is the

46. See generally id. at arts. 2 (exploration and use), 4 (accord), 7 (accord), and 8 (landing on and
launching space objects from the Moon, and placing facilities and personnel anywhere on or below the surface).
47. Compare Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 11, with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II.
48. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 11.5.
49. Id.
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“international regime” referenced in the Moon Agreement. Article 11.7 identifies
the main purposes of the international regime as: “the orderly and safe
development of the natural resources of the Moon; the rational management of
those resources; [and] the expansion of opportunities in the use of those
50
resources.” In the abstract, these purposes are neither unreasonable nor
controversial. An international legal regime—whether or not it is developed
pursuant to Article 11—can also serve as a means to establish priorities,
adjudicate disputes, and provide appropriate notice to and among entities
conducting activities on celestial bodies. The international legal regime could be
further utilized for other purposes, such as protecting the environment, enforcing
licensing and authorization of private entities, establishing outer space traffic
51
rules, and other political or humanitarian goals.
The Moon Agreement identifies one such goal in article 11.7(d):
An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from
those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing
countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given
52
special consideration.
The declaration that the Moon and its resources are the “common heritage of
53
mankind,” subject to a mandatory sharing of benefits, is the primary reason why
the Moon Agreement has not received widespread acceptance since it was
54
opened for signature more than thirty-five years ago.
The legal implications of the “common heritage of mankind” vis-a-vis
celestial resources are yet to be determined. Nonetheless, the corpus juris
spatialis establishes the fundamental elements of the legal regime of commercial
space. Together with the domestic regimes for authorization and continuing
supervision, significant protections are provided for space entrepreneurs. These
protections eliminate the justifications for private appropriation claims and
provide a means to enforce enterprise rights without resorting to military
conquest.

50. Id. at art. 11.7.
51. Aldo Armando Cocca, Property Rights on the Moon and Celestial Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
39TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 9, 11, n. 12 (1997) (citing L. Szalóky, The Way of the
Further Perfection of the Legal Regulation Concerning the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Especially
Regarding the Exploitation of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 196, 198 (1974)); Henri A. Wassenbergh, The
International Regulation of an Equitable Utilization of Natural Outer Space Resources, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 39TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 138, 140 (1997).
52. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 11.7(d).
53. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. IX.
54. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at arts. 11.1, 11.7(d).
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VI. PROTECTION OF ENTERPRISE RIGHTS IN SPACE
The justification for claims that private appropriation is necessary or
desirable rests on two prongs: first, to give recognition to the right of the
claimant to occupy an area and utilize resources; and second, to exclude others
from occupying the same area. However, a claim of appropriation by itself is
insufficient and ineffective to protect either of these interests. There is no
assurance that any state would recognize the claim or be deterred from
conducting its own mission to the claimed area.
The enterprise rights of space entrepreneurs, including the right to occupy an
area without interference, are protected without the necessity of a claim of
appropriation. Space activities are difficult, fraught with risk, and require large
amounts of capital and lengthy time frames. Space entrepreneurs must receive
55
authorization from their state of nationality. A state that grants authority to a
56
private entity is internationally responsible for the activities of that entity. There
are a limited number of entities that could potentially embark on a mission to
interfere with an authorized private venture on the Moon or other celestial body:
the state that granted the authority to the private entity; a private entity that is a
national of the same state as the authorized entity; another state or a private entity
of that other state; or rogue entities.
It is unlikely that a state that granted authorization to a private entity would
purposely interfere with the activities of that authorized entity in situ. An
authorizing state has a broad array of traditional means and mechanisms that it
could utilize, if desired, to limit or restrict the private entity’s actions, and which
would be much less costly and considerably more efficient than launching a
mission to conduct interference with activities on a celestial body. Moreover,
these administrative and judicial remedies may all be pursued on Earth, as the
private entity will continue to have a presence on this planet and be subject to the
authorizing state’s personal jurisdiction.
It would also be unlikely for an entity to interfere with another entity that is
granted authority by the same state. An application or request for authorization to
conduct a mission with clear intent to cause physical interference with an existing
facility on a celestial body would have little chance of obtaining regulatory
approval. The state itself would object to such a purpose. The entity operating the
authorized facility certainly would object. In addition, members of the public and
other interested groups and entities may have an opportunity to object to the
second entity’s request for authorization, pursuant to domestic administrative or
judicial procedures.

55. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. VI. Depending upon the specific parameters of a mission,
authorization may be required from more than one state.
56. Id. arts. VI, VII; see generally Liability Convention, supra note 5.
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It may be possible for a second entity to request a state to authorize a
commercial mission in close proximity to a facility the state previously
authorized. To the extent that the potential exists for interference to occur, which
is recognized during the authorization process, the state can consult with the
parties or otherwise provide an opportunity for them to be heard. And, after
appropriate administrative or other procedures, they may deny the request or
impose conditions, restrictions, or other requirements to prevent the potential for
interference. Where interference occurs in situ, these same kinds of modifications
can be made to the license or other grant of authority, which would be an
appropriate implementation of the state’s obligation to provide continuing
supervision of its non-governmental entities in space. An aggrieved party could
seek to invoke administrative or judicial procedures, including, in appropriate
cases, provisional remedies or injunctive relief as available under domestic law.
Enforcement of an order by physical means against an entity in situ on the
Moon or other celestial body would not likely be possible, at least not in the short
term. Nevertheless, the means to enforce an order on the entity’s Earth-based
components are available pursuant to extant domestic laws, and can include
revocation of the authority to conduct the commercial space operation,
restrictions on communications links, cease and desist orders, injunctions,
attachment of property, fines, currency and banking limitations, and, in proper
cases, criminal charges. Where the interference is of a kind other than physical
disturbance, such as infringement of intellectual property rights or unfair
competition, disputes and claims arising therefrom would essentially be no
different than the corresponding claims of these types raised and resolved on a
daily basis on Earth according to existing domestic and international law. Even
though a dispute may originate from an activity on a celestial body, the resolution
process may well be conducted on Earth.
The potential for interference with a commercial space enterprise could come
from the activities of other states or their nationals. Where a state is aware that
activities it is planning may potentially cause harmful interference with the
activities of another state, Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty requires that such
state initiate consultations with the other state. Conversely, where a state
conducting activities becomes aware that another state’s activities could cause
interference with its own activities, the first state may request the latter state to
57
engage in consultations. The Moon Agreement contains a corresponding
procedure in Articles 5, 8.3 and 15.2, but it requires states to participate in
58
consultations if another state requests. A request for consultations is not
restricted to bilateral discussions as other states may seek to join therein. Should
interference occur, liability could be imposed pursuant to the provisions of the
57. Id.
58. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 15.2.
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Outer Space Treaty, and, where applicable, the Liability Convention. As with
proceedings for domestic disputes, the diplomatic or other mechanisms for
resolving controversies involving two or more states would be conducted on
Earth.
States are able to regulate their national’s exercise of enterprise through
domestic processes and procedures pursuant to the obligation to authorize and
continuously supervise the activities of non-governmental entities in space. In the
performance of this duty, states can be expected to coordinate the authorized
activities of entities to prevent harmful interference with each other, and with the
activities of the state itself. Where more than one state is concerned or involved,
the consultation procedures under the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon
Agreement provide international recognition of authorized non-governmental
entities’ right to occupy a location on a celestial body and utilize the resources
60
thereof. The authorizing state will represent the interests and enterprise rights of
non-governmental entities during the consultations. The non-appropriation
doctrine prohibits reservations of areas and claims of a right to future occupancy.
However, potential conflicts between different states’ missions that are in the
planning stage are nonetheless subject to consultations that should seek to
coordinate both parties’ activities and thereby avoid harmful interference
61
between them.
There is no guarantee, of course, that the consultations will successfully
resolve the dispute. However, they are an appropriate mechanism to be utilized in
the first instance. Moreover, while states are engaging in consultations to resolve
a dispute, they are less likely to engage in belligerent and provocative activities
in situ. Thus, the domestic authorization procedure and the international
consultations framework provide significant protection for the right of authorized
entities to occupy and utilize a celestial location. If a state was determined to
interfere with another states’ public or private entities in space and all available
diplomatic and international procedures failed to resolve or diffuse the situation,
it would signify a breakdown in international relations extending far beyond the
specific space activity at issue.
It would be extremely difficult for a rogue entity to interfere with a facility in
situ, but the possibility cannot be completely excluded. Should a rogue entity
acquire the launch equipment or services, hardware, and other means and
capabilities to conduct such a mission, it would not be deterred by a claim of
appropriation by a private entity. Moreover, a proper response to the rogue entity
would likely require coordinated participation by several nations.

59. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at arts. VI, VII; Liability Convention, supra note 5, at arts. III, IV,
V.
60. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. IX; Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 15.
61. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 5.
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The regulation of enterprise rights in space is in the early stages of
development, and there is still much to be done. The scope of existing domestic
procedures for authorizing enterprise rights does not expressly extend to the
conduct of activities on the Moon or other celestial bodies. States will need to
draft laws and regulations for administrative agencies to have the authority to
license these activities, such as the recent request of Bigelow Aerospace for
guidance regarding a potential lunar mission, the ASTEROIDS Act, introduced
62
in the United States Congress in 2014, or the SPACE Act of 2015. These
domestic procedures must be consistent with the provisions of the space treaties,
several of which have particular relevance to enterprise rights in addition to
Article II of the Outer Space Treaty and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement.
A. Right of Visitation
The corpus juris spatialis protects a non-governmental entity’s right to
occupy a location on a celestial body, but this right is not unconditional. Article
XII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that states have the right of visitation of
all stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other
celestial bodies. This visitation right is an important mechanism for firsthand
state representative observation to assist in determining whether activities are
being conducted in compliance with international law. The Outer Space Treaty
requires advance notice to ensure safe operation of the facility to be visited and to
prevent interference, but does not require the visited entity to supply
63
transportation to the facility. Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty conditions the
64
right of visitation on a “basis of reciprocity.” In Article 15.1, the Moon
Agreement similarly provides for a right of visitation, although it does not
require reciprocity.
B. Duty of Disclosure
The Registration Convention requires disclosure of specific information
regarding objects launched into outer space, however, the obligatory disclosures
are limited to data concerning the launch, registration number or other
designation, location, general function, and, where applicable, basic orbital
65
parameters of the objects. The Moon Agreement requires certain disclosures at
62. Berin Szoka & Jim Dunstan, Commentary, Space Property Rights: Here’s Where to Start,
SPACENEWS (Jan. 27, 2014), http://spacenews.com/39294space-property-rights-its-time-and-heres-where-tostart/#sthash.1BudbLTz.dpuf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); ASTEROIDS Act, H.R.
5063, 113th Cong. (2014); SPACE Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-90 (2015).
63. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3.
64. Id.
65. Registration Convention, supra note 6, at art. IV.
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regular intervals for activities conducted on the Moon. Article 5 provides that
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be informed of the nature,
conduct, locations, and results of activities in space, and the information is to be
67
disseminated to the public. States also are required to disclose “any phenomena
they discover in space” or on the Moon that “could endanger human life or
68
health, as well as any indication of organic life.” These disclosure requirements
could require states to take sufficient precautions to protect intellectual property,
other business and trade secrets, and confidential information as much as
possible.
While Article 6.2 of the Moon Agreement permits the collection, removal,
and utilization of samples from the subsurface and surface, it further provides
that states “shall have regard to the desirability of making a portion of such
samples available to other interested States Parties and the international scientific
69
community for scientific investigation.” Thus, a private entrepreneur may be
required to provide samples of extracted materials to other states for scientific
investigation. The article does not require reimbursement of the cost of acquiring
70
or extracting such samples.
C. Environmental Protection
Non-governmental entities will need to comply with Article IX of the Outer
Space Treaty, which provides that states “shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them
71
so as to avoid their harmful contamination. . . .” In Article 7, the Moon
Agreement expands on this directive and contains an affirmative obligation of
states to “take measures to prevent disruption of the existing balance of [the
celestial] environment, whether by introducing adverse changes in that
environment, by its harmful contamination through the introduction of extra72
environmental matter or otherwise.” The presence of humans or robotic
spacecraft on a celestial body inevitably will cause some disruption to the pristine
natural environment. However, the impact of human activity, especially
involving mining or extraction of resources, must be limited as much as possible.
The Moon Agreement, Article 7.3, establishes that states “shall report to
other States parties and to the [U.N.] Secretary-General concerning areas of the
moon having special scientific interest in order that . . . consideration may be
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
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Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 5.
Id.
Id. at art. 5.3.
Id. at art. 6.2.
Id. at art. 6.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 3, at art. IX.
Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 7.1.
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given to the designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for
73
which special protective arrangements are to be agreed . . .” For example, some
have proposed to dedicate areas of the lunar far side for radio astronomy, as it is
74
a zone uniquely shielded from transmissions emanating from Earth. These
protective arrangements are similar to the “special regions” in the planetary
protection policy, which is especially concerned with the search for
75
extraterrestrial life or its remnants or precursors. These special regions are areas
where it is believed that water, in the form of surface or subsurface ice, may be
present. Spacecraft landing in a special region must achieve Viking-level
sterility, even where the craft is not intended to conduct life detection
76
experiments. These special regions generally relate to Mars, although it is
possible that areas of the Moon, particularly the poles or other areas where ice
may be present, could be designated as special regions. The Moon Agreement
provides that the designation of an area as an international scientific preserve is
77
“without prejudice to the rights of other States Parties” to the treaty. The
designation as a special region, however, is a scientific and not a legal
declaration. Nevertheless, enterprise rights could be limited or even prohibited in
special regions as appropriate in specific factual settings.
VII. THE WAY FORWARD
The legal regime for commercial space is in the early stages of development.
Many of the basic elements essential for space commerce are set forth in the
existing space treaties and will be supplemented by future international
agreements and regulation. National licensing regimes and other forms of
domestic procedures for authorization and supervision of non-governmental
entities in space further supplement the legal regime and provide a means for
states to regulate private sector activities in compliance with their treaty
obligations. Several developments in other realms of international law have
relevance to enterprise rights and could be instructive as to the manner in which
enterprise rights in celestial resources will be defined and enforced.

73. Id. at art. 7.3.
74. Claudio Maccone, The Quiet Cone Above the Farside of the Moon, 53 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA, 65, 65
(2002).
75. See generally Committee on Space Research, COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy, at A–5 (Oct. 20,
2002), available at http://science.nasa.gov/media/medialibrary/2012/05/04/COSPAR_Planetary_Protection_
Policy_v3-24-11.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Leslie I. Tennen, Evolution of the
Planetary Protection Policy: Conflict of Science and Jurisprudence?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 45TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 466, 472 (2003), reprinted in 34 ADVANCES IN SPACE RES. 2354,
2360 (2004).
76. COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy, supra note 75.
77. Moon Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 7.3.
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The Law of the Sea Convention, for example, was amended in 1994 to
increase the representation of states commensurate with their interests in the
governance of seabed resources, revise the mandatory disclosure requirements
for private entities, and reform the governing International Seabed Authority
78
such that it is no longer in direct competition with commercial entities. It is
noteworthy that the Law of the Sea Convention declared the resources of the
seabed to be the common heritage of mankind. The position of the United States
was that “the Agreement, by restructuring the seabed mining regime along free
market lines, endorses the consistent view of the United States that the common
heritage principle fully comports with private economic activity in accordance
79
with market principles.”
In 1996, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on International
Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the
Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing
80
Countries. The Declaration emphasized opportunity and focused on promoting
and fostering international cooperation on an equitable and mutually acceptable
81
basis. It did not mandate any particular format of cooperation between states,
but rather, the concerned countries must determine which modes are most
82
effective and appropriate.
The dispute resolution process of the World Trade Organization (WTO) was
83
substantially revised in 1994. These revisions “reflect a fundamental shift in the
nature of international trade dispute settlement from a political, consensus-based
84
process to a more legalistic system.” The dispute resolution process accentuates
the rule of law and enhances the predictability and institutional neutrality of the
WTO.
These examples demonstrate that the common heritage of mankind principle
does not impose an insurmountable burden to the private sector developing and
exercising enterprise rights on celestial bodies. There is an international
movement toward resolving disputes on the basis of the rule of law, rather than

78. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement
Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982, U.N.G.A. Res. A/RES/48/263 (Aug. 17, 1994).
79. LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL FROM PRESIDENT WILLIAM J. CLINTON, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEXES, AND THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, WITH ANNEX, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103–39,
103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., at 61 (Oct. 7, 1994).
80. G.A. Res. 51/122, U.N. A/RES/51/122 (Dec. 13, 1996).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401.
84. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY AND U.S. IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 585 (Terence P. Stewart, ed. 1996).
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by purely political and other considerations. This reliance on the rule of law
provides stability and predictability and enhances opportunities for the private
sector. The relationship and interplay between an international regulatory regime
and domestic authorization and licensing regimes must await future development,
including whether and to what extent the international regulatory regime will
harmonize national authorization and licensing procedures and processes.
It is unclear whether the international regime that the Moon Agreement
envisioned will be established, or whether some other form of international
regulatory regime will emerge. Nevertheless, whatever course is taken, particular
focus should be placed on the promotion of opportunity, as well as the rule of
law, in the creation of any regulatory structure. There should be an emphasis on
market principles. A flexible and evolutionary approach should be adopted, and
international cooperation must be promoted. In the event there is a centralized
organization created to act as an international regulatory body, the bureaucratic
structure should be limited, and provide for appropriate representation of states
commensurate with their interests. The international regime must not engage in
unfair competition with the private entities subject to its regulatory authority.
Similarly, provisions should require a neutral arbiter to aid in resolving disputes.
Finally, the equality of opportunity must be preserved.
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